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BOOK REVIEWS
the facts, should here, as in the case of Buck v. Kuykendall (267
U. S. 307-1925), decide a commerce clause case without regard
to the facts."
Running through the book is the argument, by which apparently the court itself is moved in the later decisions (see Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U. S. 497, 503), that the
test of the validity of state action under the Commerce clause is
the reasonableness of the regulation. "The court is really engaged in weighing the reasonable necessity for state regulation
of action which takes place within the confines of the state, as
against its reasonable or unreasonable effect on interstate
commerce."
Professor Gavit's book is a distinct and a new contribution to
the legal literature on this troublesome little clause in the Constitution. It will aid the lawyer and the court not only in determining whether his case involves the Commerce Clause but
also in distinguishing and harmonizing the many decisions so
that the real issue may be defined and decided.
FRANK N. RICHMAN.

Columbus, Indiana.
Cases on ConstitutionalLaw. By Walter F. Dodd. (West Publishing Company. 1932. Pp. xxxii-1509.)
Cases on ConstitutionalLaw. Second Edition. By Joseph Ragland Long. (Lawyers' Cooperative Publishing Company.
1932. Pp. xx-1182.)
Cases on ConstitutionalLaw. By Dudley 0. McGovney. (BobbsMerrill Company. 1930. Pp. xxxix-1803.)
Cases on Constitutional Law. By Henry Rottschaefer. (Commerce Clearing House. 1932. Pp. xxx-1196.)
The teachers of constitutional law have had given to them
within the last two years four new casebooks for consideration,
and there is another casebook promised some time soon by Noel
T. Dowling of Columbia. All of these new books are excellent
casebooks. Any teacher of constitutional law could present the
subject of constitutional law well by the use of any one of these
books. However, there are a great many differences in the books
now available, and there are some criticisms of all of the books
which any reviewer would probably make.
One criticism which this reviewer would make of all of the
new casebooks is the over-editing of the important leading
cases. In some cases this has been carried so far as completely
to eliminate them. The result of such over-editing is that the
books present morticed excerpts from many cases, but no adequate report of any of them. For this reason, it would be more
accurate to call these casebooks textbooks than to call them casebooks. The reviewer would prefer to have more complete
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reports of the leading cases. If the more important leading
cases were given such treatment, he would not object to having
the gaps between these cases filled in with less important cases
edited to the bone and with periodical and other materials.
The chief fault of Hall's Cases on Constitutional Law was this
over-editing of the leading cases. The books now under review
have not improved upon Hall's Cases in this respect. The Dartmouth College Case is entirely omitted by Mr. Rottschaefer, and
it is not printed, but only reported on by Mr. McGovney. All
of the others give it very short treatment, but Mr. Long the
shortest treatment of all. The case of MeCulloch v. Maryland
is given short treatment by all, but Mr. McGovney offends the
least in this respect. The case of Cohens v. Virginia is entirely
omitted by Mr. McGovney and Mr. Rottschaefer, is referred to
by Mr. Dodd, as by Mr. Hall, only in a note, but is included by
Mr. Long in his casebook. The case of Brown v. Maryland is
included by all of the casebooks under review, but it is given the
shortest treatment by Mr. McGovney. The Dred Scott Case is
omitted by Mr. Dodd and Mr. Rottschaefer, but is included by
Mr. Long and Mr. McGovney. Mr. Long gives it six pages and
Mr. McGovney thirteen pages. The case of Texas v. White is
omitted entirely by Mr. Rottschaefer and is omitted by Mr. Dodd
and Mr. McGovney except for short excerpts, but it is included
by Mr. Long. The case of Munn v. Illinois is omitted by Mr.
Rottschaefer, but is included by the others and given six pages
by Mr. Long, eight pages by Mr. Dodd, and twelve pages by Mr.
McGovney. The Slaughter-House Cases is included by all, but
is given different space by the different editors. Mr. McGovney
gives it only four pages, Mr. Rottschaefer a little over seven
pages, and Mr. Dodd and Mr. Long twelve pages. The case of
Downes v. Bidwell is entirely omitted by Mr. McGovney and Mr.
Rottschaefer, and is omitted by Mr. Dodd except for a short
quotation, but is given seven pages by Mr. Long. The case of
Adkins v. Children's Hospital is included by all and is given
about the same space by Mr. Dodd, Mr. Long and Mr. Rottschaefer, but about twice this much space by Mr. McGovney.
The case of Cook v. Tait is omitted by Mr. Long and by Mr.
Dodd except for a note, but is given about two pages of treatment by Mr. McGovney and by Mr. Rottschaefer. The case of
Frick v. Pennsylvania is omitted by Mr. Long and is given from
five to seven pages by the other editors. The case of Hammer v.
Dagenhart is included by all of the editors, and is given from
six to eight pages by them. The case of Terrall v. Burke is
omitted by Mr. Long and Mr. Rottschaefer and is given a little
over one page by Mr. Dodd and a little over two pages by Mr.
McGovney. The case of Missouri v. Holland is included by all,
and is given from three to five pages by them. The National
Prohibition Cases is included by all except Mr. Rottschaefer, and
is given from two to four pages by them. Mr. Dowling promises
a casebook built on the opposite theory. He plans not only to
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include more of the opinions of the courts, but also some of the
arguments of attorneys and the statutes or other governmental
action involved in the cases. When this book is published, it will
be interesting to compare it with the books now under review.
If Mr. Dowling can succeed not only in giving adequate treatment to the important leading cases, but also in giving adequate
treatment to all of the important constitutional law doctrines or
concepts, his book will make a great appeal, at least to some
teachers of constitutional law.
All of the four books under review, with the exception of Mr.
Rottschaefer's, include about the same leading cases. Mr. Rotschaefer's book emphasizes modern cases and, therefore, omits
a great many of the earlier cases which show constitutional
changes and growth and which laid the foundation for constitutional law. There are thirteen cases found in Hall's casebook
and the four cases under review. There are thirty-one cases
found in Hall, McGovney, Dodd and Rottschaefer's casebooks.
There are sixty cases found in Hall, McGovney, Long, and
Dodd's casebooks. There are ninety-four cases found in Hall,
McGovney, and Dodd's casebooks. There are one hundred and
sixty-six cases found in Hall and McGovney's casebooks.
There are one hundred sixty cases found in Hall and Dodd's
casebooks. There are five cases found in McGovney, Long,
Dodd, and Rottschaefer's casebooks but not in Hall's. There
are fourteen found in McGovney, Long, and Dodd's casebooks
but not in Hall. There are thirty cases found in McGovney and
Long's casebooks but not in Hall's. There are twenty-six cases
found in McGovney's and Rottschaefer's casebooks but not in
Hall's. There are forty cases found in McGovney and Dodd's
casebooks but not in Hall's. There are twelve cases found in
Long, Dodd, and Rottschaefer's casebooks but not in Hall or
McGovney's casebooks. There are twenty-one cases found in
Long and Rottschaefer's casebooks but not in Hall or McGovney's cases. There are twenty-two cases in Long and Dodd's
casebooks but not in Hall or McGovney's casebooks. There are
three cases found in Hall, Long, Dodd and Rottschaefer's casebooks but not in McGovney's. There are eight cases found in
Hall, Dodd, and Rottschaefer's casebooks but not in McGovney's.
There are twenty-nine cases found in Hall, Long and Dodd's
casebooks but not in McGovney's. There are sixty-six cases
found in Hall and Dodd's casebooks but not in McGovney's.
Thus, it is seen that while there are some variations, yet from
the standpoint of leading cases, either Hall, McGovney or Dodd's
cases would be adequate, and perhaps Long's cases.
As to the other cases, there is not so much agreement. There
are one hundred twenty-seven cases in Long's casebook which
are not found in Hall or McGovney's casebooks. There are one
hundred forty-three cases in Dodd's casebook which are not
found in Hall or in McGovney's casebooks. There are one hundred forty-seven cases in Rottschaefer's casebook not found
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in Hall or McGovney's casebook. Mr. McGovney has two hundred eighty-seven cases not cited in Hall or Hall's Supplement.
Mr. Long has the fewest cases and, of course, as above indicated,
in general the shortest excerpts from the opinions. Mr. McGovney is somewhat erratic in his selections. Perhaps he has too
many cases on the topic of the supremacy of the Supreme Court
and the topic of due process of law, but he has no cases at all,
but only a magazine article, on the topic of separation of powers,
although some of his cases in Chapter 7 also develop the law
of separation of powers. But, of course, a teacher can make
his own omissions when he is supplied -with too much material.
It seems to the reviewer that Mr. Dodd has not included enough
materials upon the subject of eminent domain.
When it comes to the topics covered, there is considerable
dissimilarity. All of the casebooks under discussion omit the
topic of sovereignty. Long's casebook surprisingly covers most
of the other topics in constitutional law, although, as already
indicated, the treatment is often rather meager. McGovney's
casebook omits the topics of jury trial, treaties, territory of the
United States, and amendment. Dodd's casebook omits the topic
of territory, except for notes. Rottschaefer's casebook omits
the topics of citizenship and suffrage, territory, Indians, aliens,
powers, privileges and immunities of United States citizenship,
due process as to procedure, freedom of speech and the press,
religious liberty, and slavery, and has very little material on the
subject of treaties. These omissions are rather extensive and,
so far as the reviewer can see, these sacrifices are not compensated for by better treatment of the topics covered.
So far as analysis and arrangement are concerned, there is
some dissimilarity in all of the books and some variations which
merit discussion. All of the books, except Mr. Long's, treat
the doctrine of the supremacy of the Supreme Court first. Mr.
Long treats this fourth. Mr. Dodd and Mr. Rottschaefer treat
the doctrine of separation of powers second, Mr. Long third,
and Mr. McGovney fourth. Mr. Dodd and Mr. Rottschaefer
treat the doctrine of our dual form of government third, Mr.
McGovney second, and Mr. Long first and sixth. Mr. Dodd treats
the doctrine of citizenship and suffrage fifth, Mr. McGovney
third, Mr. Long second, and Mr. Rottschaefer, of course, not at
all. Mr. Dodd treats the doctrine of personal liberty and social
control fourth, Mr. McGovney fifth, Mr. Long seventh, and Mr.
Rottschaefer last. Mr. Dodd treats the doctrine of amendability
of the Constitution last, and Mr. Long fifth. Mr. Rottschaefer
hides it in Chapter Five under the federal legislative powers,
and Mr. McGovney does not treat it at all. Mr. Long has broken
up the various topics and has treated them partly in one place
and partly in another. Mr. McGovney has perhaps given us
the greatest variety of treatment. In connection with certain
topics, he has emphasized the historical approach. In connection
with other topics, he has attempted what he calls "taking the
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law in cross-section."

He has more or less mixed up the topic

of our dual form of government. Mr. Rottschaefer purports
to organize his materials dealing with constitutional limitations
on the basis of the character of the interests that ought to be
protected, while Mr. Dodd and, for that matter the other men,
have undertaken to arrange their materials according to constitutional doctrines or concepts. The reviewer wonders whether
or not Mr. Rottschaefer has accomplished his purpose. He has
treated the police power under due process of law, but apparently
does not so treat the topics of taxation and eminent domain.
On the whole, it seems to the reviewer that Mr. Rottschaefer's
analysis and arrangement of his materials on constitutional limitations are somewhat confused and confusing and of doubtful
expediency outside the police power. While due process in a
way protects the interest in personal liberty against social control, whether in the form of the police power or of taxation or
of eminent domain, yet the police power rather than the constitutional limitation is the great sovereign power which protects
most of our social interests. The Supreme Court, in expounding
the police power, has recognized and created new legal social
interests and thereby given us a natural law with a changing
content. Under the police power, in spite of the due process
clause, it has developed and protected social interests. Under
taxation and eminent domain it has not so much protected social
interests as it has made the due process clause a limitation on
social control, although it is true it has stretched the power
of taxation and the power of eminent domain so as to protect
the social interest in our political institutions in spite of the constitutional limitations. If personal liberty is the social interest
which the constitutional limitations seek to protect, there are
other constitutional limitations, like those referring to freedom
of speech and the press, religious liberty, slavery and suffrage,
which protect personal liberty as much as the due process clause,
but these are not treated by Mr. Rottschaefer. However he
does treat the contract clause. The order of some of the materials raises questions in the mind of the reviewer. Some of
these have already been referred to. In addition, the reviewer
cannot understand why the case of Allgeyer v. Louisian is located where it is in Mr. Rottschaefer's casebook, unless he wants
us to understand that there is nothing in historical development.
The reviewer does not understand why Mr. Dodd preferred to
treat due process of law as a matter of procedure after due
process as a matter of substance, and he wonders why, in Chapter Nine, in order more completely to show the historical development of due process of law, he did not include some materials
on Coke's Dictum and the Slaughter House Caes and the case
of Murray v. Hoboken. He also cannot understand why the
case of Piqua Bank v. Knoop has the place given to it in Mr.
Dodd's book under the topic of "Laws Impairing the Obligation
of Contracts" instead of immediately following the Dartmouth
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College Case, nor why the case of Clark v. Nash has been
omitted in the topic of eminent domain.
So far as notes, periodical material, and other aids are concerned, a few further comments may be noted. All of the books
have indexes with the exception of Mr. McGovney's. This seems
to the reviewer to be a serious omission in Mr. McGovney's
book. Mr. Long has very few notes, but the notes in all the
other casebooks seem to be sufficiently adequate, critical, and
valuable. All of the books are somewhat defective in their use
of periodical material. Mr. Long has made almost no use of
periodical material. The others make considerable use of periodical material. Mr. Rottschaefer has undertaken to make his
periodical material more helpful by a bibliography, but this
bibliography is somewhat partial and incomplete, so that it is
questionable whether or not this adds much to the usefulness
of his book. Mr. Dodd hag inserted some explanatory material
of his own, but its accuracy is sometimes questionable. Note
Section 1, The Judicial Function.
The reviewer has in this review only stated his own position
with reference to the matters which he has criticized. His
review would not be one which he should write unless he did
this. Other reviewers would, of course, voice their personal
criticisms. This reviewer does not know whether or not other
reviewers would agree with him. Yet, in spite of all that he
has said, he would like to repeat what he said at the beginning
of this review, that all of these casebooks are good books, and
any teacher would not make a mistake in adopting any of them.
Any one of them would, in the judgment of this reviewer, be a
better teaching tool than prior casebooks. Mr. Hall's book had
become almost impossible as a teaching tool. This reviewer
has himself come to the conclusion that for his own purposes
Mr. Dodd's Cases on Constitutional Law is better adapted for
his uses than any other book available at the present time.
If Mr. Dodd's was not available he would choose Mr. McGovney's
book. Of course, he bases his judgment upon the data set forth
in this review. Whether or not the data will influence others
to come to the same conclusion is, of course, a matter with
which this reviewer is not concerned. One of the chief reasons
for the reviewer's not selecting Mr. Rottschaeffer's book is its
omission of old leading cases. The reviewer is one of those
teachers of constitutional law who believes that it is a serious
mistake for a case book on constitutional law to omit those old
foundation cases, decided on reason instead of authority, which
give the historical development of the principles of constitutional
law and tie them together with some sort of coherency and continuity. He wants to teach more than a temporary cross section
of constitutional law.
HUGH E. WmLis.

Indiana University School of Law.

